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Since the failure of the Havana Charter in 1950, it has not been possible to agree upon a
binding competition law at the global level. However, following the fiasco of the World Trade
Organization (WTO) Ministerial Conference in Cancún in 2003, the number of bilateral and
regional trade agreements containing competition law chapters, or at least competition-related
rules, has increased noteworthy. This reflects that trade and competition are closely intertwined.
In an ever more integrated, globalized, and digitized economy, the competition law framework
needs to be internationalized. If a binding competition law is not possible at the global level, it is
only logical that bilateral and regional trade agreements fill the gap. This article questions the
extent to which these agreements contribute to the convergence of competition law. In this context,
the development in Northeast Asia seems promising and may provide a guidepost for establishing
international standards of competition law cooperation and enforcement. Presented here is the idea
of localized harmonization, which takes advantage of closer affinity between bilateral and
regional partners. With a sufficient degree of convergence, it is not excluded that efforts towards
a multilateral competition agreement could be relaunched one day.
Keywords: competition law, world trade law, WTO, free trade agreement, regional trade agree-
ment, bilateral cooperation, convergence, localized harmonization, Asian competition law, digital
economy
1 INTRODUCTION
Trade law and competition law1 share a common goal, which is the protection of the
competitive process in open markets, thereby maximizing the welfare of the society,
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1 In most countries, competition law commonly refers to the law that aims to prevent anti-competitive
business practices by undertakings, whereas this body of law is named antitrust law in the United States
(US). See e.g. Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, EU Competition Law: Text, Cases, and Materials 3 (Oxford
University Press 6th ed. 2016); Brendan J. Sweeney, The Internationalisation of Competition Rules 11
(Routledge 2010).
including the optimal allocation of international resources and the promotion of
innovation.2 There is a converging view that, without national competition law and
policy, it is difficult to have free trade. In other words, the existence of private restraints
on international trade3 through the use of private economic power,4 such as the collusive
practices of discriminating foreign enterprises, generates market entry barriers: interna-
tional and national cartels influence market access.5 For example, cartels at the down-
stream level or vertical restraints have negative effects similar to those of import tariffs,
and collusion at the upstream level or abuse of market dominance may have effects
analogous to export tariffs.6 Therefore, an appropriate legal framework to remove
these private restraints on trade or barriers to market access plays an important role
for international trade.7
The fields of trade and competition law are often considered to be
complementary8; indeed, a common focus of trade law and competition law is
to eliminate barriers to entry. Thus, competition law does not stand in opposition
to but is consistent with free trade.9 In particular, the globalization of commerce
has prompted the adoption of competition laws when, after the increase in
transactions across borders, potentially anti-competitive effects are observed.10
Therefore, the spread of competition laws is an apparent reaction to the globaliza-
tion of both national and international businesses.11 The transition to a market
economy system and rapid globalization have led to an increase in the number of
2 Christian A. Conrad, Strategies to Reform the Regulations on International Competition, 26 World Comp. 101
(2003); Seema Gaur, Competition Provisions in Trade Agreements: How to Realise their Potential?, Pursuing
Competition and Regulatory Reforms for Achieving Sustainable Development Goals 347–348 (CUTS International
ed., CUTS International 2016); F. M. Scherer, Competition Policies for an Integrated World Economy 1–2
(Brookings 1994). Despite converging views on the ultimate goals of both laws, they often interpret certain
business practices (such as price discrimination and predation) differently, indicating some divergence. See
Christopher M. Barbuto, Toward Convergence or Antitrust and Trade Law: An International Trade Analogue to
Robinson-Patman, 62 Fordham L. Rev. 2047, 2048–2049 (1994).
3 Jürgen Basedow, Competition Policy in a Globalized Economy: From Extraterritorial Application to
Harmonization, in The International Handbook of Competition 33 (Manfred Neumann & Jürgen
Weigand eds, Edward Elgar 2004).
4 See e.g. Lawrence A. Sullivan, Warren S. Grimes & Christopher L. Sagers, The Law of Antitrust: An
Integrated Handbook 3 (3d ed., West Academic Publishing 2016).
5 Simon J. Evenett & Valerie Y. Suslow, Preconditions for Private Restraints on Market Access and
International Cartels, 3 J. Int’l Econ. L. 593 (2000).
6 Frederic M. Scherer, International Trade and Competition Policy, in Competition and Trade Policies:
Coherence or Conflict? 13–14 (Einar Hope & Per Maeleng eds, Routledge 1998). Cartels have long
been considered harmful to trade. See also Joel Davidow, Cartels, Competition Laws and the Regulation of
International Trade, 15 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 351 (1983).
7 Kevin Kennedy, Competition Law and the World Trade Organisation: The Limits of Multilateralism 1 (Sweet &
Maxwell 2001). International cartelization often creates complex issues for national competition authorities
because they are responsible for investigations of cartel members in their own and other jurisdictions. See also
Mark S. LeClair, Cartelization, Antitrust and Globalization in the US and Europe 89 (Routledge 2013).
8 See Kennedy, supra n. 7, at 4.
9 Leonard Waverman, Competition and/or Trade Policy?, in Competition and Trade Policies: Coherence or
Conflict? 33 (Einar Hope & Per Maeleng eds, Routledge 1998).
10 See Jones & Sufrin, supra n. 1, at 1207; Kennedy, supra n. 7, at 1.
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competition regimes, recently reaching more than 130 jurisdictions,12 demonstrat-
ing the importance of competition law with regard to the business conduct of
multinational enterprises (MNEs).13
Despite the growing importance of competition law for trade, there are
disparities or divergences among competition regimes that may impede the pro-
gress of trade because of their distinctive backgrounds, such as different cultures,
legal systems, politics and levels of economic development.14 For instance, a
certain type of business practice may create a competition concern in some
countries, despite not being perceived as a violation of competition law in other
jurisdictions.15 This leads to tensions between competition authorities, particularly
when they apply their competition law extraterritorially to foreign companies.16 In
effect, harmonizing competition laws may represent a solution,17 although perfect
harmonization seems rather idealistic.18 However, a moderate level of harmoniza-
tion seems feasible.19
11 David J. Gerber, The U.S. – European Conflict Over the Globalization of Antitrust Law: A Legal Experience
Perspective, 34 New Eng. L. Rev. 124, at 125 (1999).
12 Richard Whish & David Bailey, Competition Law 1 (8 ed., Oxford University Press 2015).
13 See Thomas K. Cheng, Convergence and Its Discontents: A Reconsideration of the Merits of Convergence of
Global Competition Law, 12 Chic. J. Int’l L. 433, at 436–438 (2012); Yo Sop Choi, Convergence of
Competition Laws in Northeast Asia, and the Role of the EU Competition Regime (4 Aug. 2016), http://
www.klri.re.kr/viewer/skin/doc.html?fn=rpt_7037161239242851671_GLI_2016_01.pdf&rs=/doc_
convert/FILE_000000000020971usKBF (accessed 4 Nov. 2020); Maher M. Dabbah, International and
Comparative Competition Law 1 (Cambridge University Press 2010); Sweeney, supra n. 1, at 1; Whish &
Bailey, supra n. 12, at 518.
14 Leela Cejnar & Rachel Burgess, The Globalization of Competition Law: Yes or No?, in Comparative
Competition Law 9 (John Duns, Arlens Duke & Brendan Sweeney eds, Edward Elgar 2017). For
example, South Korea has experienced a high degree of economic concentration in large conglom-
erates, the so-called chaebol, which have influenced its competition policy on large firms. See e.g. Steve
Harris, Korea, in Global Antitrust Compliance Handbook 456 (D. Daniel Sokol, Daniel Crane & Ariel
Ezrachi eds, Oxford University Press 2014).
15 Chris Noonan, The Emerging Principles of International Competition Law 1 (Oxford University Press
2008).
16 The principle of the extraterritorial application of national competition law usually relies on concepts
developed in the competition regimes of the US and the EU. Both jurisdictions apply the effects
doctrine, thereby applying domestic competition law to business practices, having an effect in their
respective territories. See e.g. David S. Evans, Why Different Jurisdictions Do Not (and Should Not) Adopt
the Same Antitrust Rules, 10 Chi. J. Int’l L. 161, at 162 (2009); Ariel Ezrachi, EU Competition Law: An
Analytical Guide to the Leading Cases 627–628 (5th ed., Hart Publishing 2016); James J. Friedberg, The
Convergence of Law in an Era of Political Integration: The Wood Pulp Case and the Alcoa Effects Doctrine, 52
U. Pitt. L. Rev. 289 (1991); Jones & Sufrin, supra n. 1, at 1222–1224; Mark S. Popofsky,
Extraterritoriality in U.S. Jurisprudence, in Issues in Competition Law and Policy 2147 (ABA Section of
Antitrust Law, ABA 2008).
17 Harmonization is often regarded as a process of creating similar outcomes in different countries. See
Noonan, supra n. 15, at 14.
18 Daniel A. Crane, Substance, Procedure, and Institutions in the International Harmonization of Competition
Policy, 10 Chi. J. Int’l L. 143 (2009).
19 See the concept of ‘loose harmonization’ as conceived by Eleanor M. Fox, Toward World Antitrust and
Market Access, 91 Am. J. Int’l L. 1, at 13 (1997).
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Bilateral and regional trade agreements may be used for this purpose.20 The
parties to these agreements may progress by mutual learning and comparative
competition law studies, defining the various local experiences involved in each
competition regime. On this basis, ‘localized harmonization’ may be achieved,
building on the specific features of the partners to the bilateral or regional agree-
ment and taking advantage of the greater similar backgrounds of states prepared to
enter into a special relationship or belonging to the same world region. Localized
harmonization may mitigate the problem of clashes in competition law and reduce
the cost of compliance for MNEs.21 In general, competition law convergence can
play a crucial role in the development of trade.22 Given the rapid proliferation of
national competition laws and the evolution of global market integration, it has
even become imperative to find common ground.23
Convergence is facilitated by the fact that most competition regimes, espe-
cially in the developing world, have been modelled on other examples, such as
those from the US, the EU, or respective neighbouring countries.24 In particular,
several Asian countries seem to have accepted competition law ideas from Europe.
One of the factors behind the significant influence of EU competition law seems to
be the fact that legal systems in these countries are based on continental European
civil law. For example, the relatively advanced competition regimes in Northeast
Asia (including South Korea, China and Japan), all of which have vigorously
enforced their competition laws, reveal a preference for legal certainty that is
similar to the approach in the EU.25 In a second step, the early adopters of
competition regimes appear to have encouraged their trading partners – which
initially only had unfledged competition regimes – to accept the European com-
petition law framework.26 In a third step, growing convergence has led to
20 For competition rules in trade agreements, see e.g. the mapping and classification exercises by Oliver
Solano & Andreas Sennekamp, Competition Provisions in Regional Trade Agreements, OECD Trade
Policy Papers, No. 31 (OECD Publishing 2006); François-Charles Laprévote, Competition Policy within
the Context of Free Trade Agreements, OECD Document DAF/COMP/GF (2019) 5 (OECD, 2019).
See also two events of the OECD Global Forum on Competition, one on regional competition
agreements in 2018 (29 Nov. 2018), http://www.oecd.org/competition/globalforum/benefits-and-
challenges-of-regional-competition-agreements.htm (accessed 4 Nov. 2020) and the other on com-
petition provisions in trade agreements in 2019 (5 Dec. 2019), http://www.oecd.org/competition/
globalforum/competition-provisions-in-trade-agreements.htm (accessed 4 Nov. 2020)
21 See Cheng, supra n. 13, at 454.
22 See Basedow, supra n. 3, at 321.
23 See Noonan, supra n. 15, at 1.
24 See Cheng, supra n. 13, at 447; William E. Kovacic, The United States and Its Future Influence on Global
Competition Policy, 22 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1157, at 1158 (2015). One of the recent examples of
foreign influence, especially by neighbouring countries, is the competition legislation in China of
2008. Its substantive provisions are very similar to those of South Korea and Japan.
25 Yo Sop Choi, The Choice of Competition Law and the Development of Enforcement in Asia: A Road Map
towards Convergence, 22 Asia Pac. L. Rev. 131, at 144 (2014).
26 See Noonan, supra n. 15, at 81.
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comparable forms of competition chapters in bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs)
in this region. This process is an example of localized harmonization as described
above.
So far, the analysis has dealt with bilateral and regional agreements that
regulate trade in general and provide for a special chapter on competition or that
contain competition rules scattered across chapters concerning other topics such as
services, intellectual property, investment or telecommunications. These trade
agreements have in common the fact that they only provide for certain principles
regarding substantive competition law or enforcement. They normally do not
specify details regarding the coordination of national competition procedures or
the cooperation of national competition authorities. However, there is a growing
demand for practical cooperation between authorities. In particular, close coordi-
nation involving competition law enforcement between trading countries can
improve the collection of evidence regarding international cartel agreements con-
cluded abroad and thereby the sharing and use of evidence to pursue international
cartel members. Moreover, a higher probability of being caught renders leniency
programmes more effective,27 even if investigations over many jurisdictions meet
certain practical problems.28 Therefore, a fourth step may be useful for countries
exposed to transnational cartels: they may seek to conclude a bilateral agreement
specifically devoted to the cooperation of their respective authorities in competi-
tion matters. The first example of such an agreement was the US – Germany
Antitrust Accord of 1976.29 Many others have followed.30
This article aims to explore recent developments in competition cooperation
between competition authorities around the world, focusing on bilateral and
regional cooperation in FTAs. It will be shown that, in the absence of binding
multilateral rules, competition chapters or rules in FTAs are not only practically
27 Leniency programmes usually grant undertakings that are involved in cartels full immunity or partial
reductions of fines imposed for the violation of competition laws, if the firm voluntarily informs
national competition authorities about undetected cartels or assists the agencies in initiating investiga-
tions and collecting evidence about such cartels. Most competition regimes have leniency programmes
in order to expose undiscovered cartels.
28 Andrew T. Guzman, Antitrust and International Regulatory Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1142, at 1145
(2001); Sweeney, supra n. 1, at 406.
29 See e.g. Scherer, supra n. 2, at 40; Noonan, supra n. 15, at 494.
30 See e.g. the 1991/1995 EU/US Competition Cooperation Agreement; 1999 EU/US Positive Comity
Agreement; 1995 US/Canada Agreement Regarding the Application of Their Competition and
Deceptive Marketing Practices Laws; 1999 US/Australia Mutual Antitrust Enforcement Assistance
Agreement; 1999 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the
Government of Japan Concerning Cooperation on Anticompetitive Activities; 2003 Agreement
between the European Community and the Government of Japan Concerning Cooperation on
Anti-Competitive Activities; 2009 Agreement between the European Community and the
Government of the Republic of Korea Concerning Cooperation on Anti-Competitive Activities;
2014 Agreement between the European Union and the Swiss Confederation Concerning Cooperation
on the Application of Their Competition Laws.
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important, but pathbreaking for future development in the digital era.31 Bilateral
and regional competition rules favour convergence, thereby reducing potential
conflicts between competition regimes. This article tackles the underlying issues as
follows. Section 2 examines recent issues of international competition law by
determining the divergence between national legislation and by identifying con-
temporary approaches to competition law. In Section 3, the article notes that the
harmonization of competition laws is increasingly pertinent, as cooperation
between authorities cannot solve all problems. Therefore, one of the tasks of
bilateral and regional trade agreements is the approximation of substantive provi-
sions, thus reducing the potential of conflicts between national regimes. Finally,
Section 4 provides the summary and conclusions of this article.
2 CRITICAL ISSUES RELATING TO COMPETITION LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
2.1 VARIOUS BACKGROUNDS OF NATIONAL COMPETITION LAWS AND THEIR IMPACT
ON TRADE
The establishment of an international competition regime has been discussed since
the 1920s.32 The first specific result was Chapter V (‘Restrictive Business
Practices’) of the Havana Charter adopted by the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Employment in 1948, although it was never ratified and was abandoned
in 1950 after the loss of the US support.33 Since then, a number of international
organizations, such as the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD), the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the
International Competition Network (ICN) have dealt with the issue of interna-
tional competition law and have provided meaningful improvements for devel-
oped and developing countries alike.34 There is no doubt that these organizations
have facilitated discussions and have considerably contributed to the convergence
31 With respect to regional cooperation, see Gaur, supra n. 2, at 358–359: ‘One common trend that seems
to emerge is that RTAs are a means of opening communication channels, which may be subsequently
expanded by the competition authorities until a satisfactory level of cooperation has been achieved’.
32 Allard D. Ham, International Cooperation in the Anti-Trust Field and in Particular the Agreement between the
United States of America and the Commission of the European Communities, 30 CML Rev. 571. 572 (1993).
33 David J. Gerber, Global Competition Law: Law, Markets, and Globalization 48 (Oxford University Press
2010); Kennedy, supra n. 7, at 122 ff.; Noonan, supra n. 15, at 405–407; Scherer, supra n. 2, at 38.
Article 46 of the Charter stipulated that each member should cooperate with the proposed interna-
tional regime to prevent any business conduct affecting trade which prevents competition, inhibits
market entry, and promotes monopolistic control. However, the Havana Charter did not provide for
meaningful cooperation regarding competition.
34 Harvey M. Applebaum, The Interface of the Trade Laws and the Antitrust Laws, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev.
479 (1998); Dabbah, supra n. 13, at 78–79; Benoît Durand, Andrés F. Galarza & Kirtikumar Mehta,
526 WORLD COMPETITION
of substantive and procedural rules.35 There was also significant hope that one day
a multilateral answer would be given in order to react to the fundamental challenge
of coordinating national competition policies. The WTO Doha Round, launched
in 2001 and comprising as one of the ‘Singapore Issues’ the interaction between
trade and competition policy, initially strengthened expectations in this respect.
However, with the provisional abandonment of the competition law topic within
the WTO after the failure of the Cancún Ministerial Conference in 2003, more
modest approaches have taken a centre stage. Indeed, competition provisions in
regional trade agreements (RTAs) or FTAs might play an important role in
harmonizing competition laws and their implementation.36 Moreover, a positive
feedback loop could be generated: combining extraterritorial application and
bilateral cooperation may not only enhance the enforcement of competition law
in the global market37 but also influence the further development of multilateral
cooperation.38
In the context of international cooperation, it is important to take into
consideration the political background of national competition policies. The
motivation for adopting a national competition law has an impact on enforcement
and on cooperation. If, for example, there is no meaningful application of national
competition law, it is not probable that international cooperation will prove
fruitful. Moreover, there is the risk of protectionism. The non-discriminatory
treatment of foreign enterprises is contingent on the existence of an effective and
objective competition law system.39
This context is particularly important for developing countries that essentially
have two types of competition legislation. One is the result of the influence of
foreign pressure to adopt competition rules,40 and the other is voluntary competi-
tion legislation emerging from public demand and insights into the benefits of
competition. The first case is represented by the adoption of competition laws in
numerous Southeast Asian countries, particularly the Association of Southeast
Asian Nations (ASEAN) Member States.41 Examples of the adoption of voluntary
The Interface Between Competition Policy and International Trade Liberalisation. Looking into the Future:
Applying a New Virtual Anti-Trust Standard, 27 World Comp. 3, at 3–4 (2004).
35 See Whish & Bailey, supra n. 12, at 1.
36 Furthermore, bilateral methods may prove less costly than multinational negotiations. See e.g. Noonan,
supra n. 15, at 50; Spence Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust Enforcement, 77 B.U.L.
Rev. 344, at 349–352 (1997).
37 See Dabbah, supra n. 13, at 7.
38 See e.g. Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law, in International Economic Law 464 (2nd ed., Andreas F.
Lowenfeld ed., Oxford University Press 2008).
39 See Choi, Convergence of Competition Laws, supra n. 13, at 21.
40 See Dabbah, supra n. 13, at 290. When a country adopts competition law due to foreign pressure, the
competition regime is understood as a mere response to the pressure; it is then difficult to expect the
same level of enforcement as that in competition regimes with voluntary legislation.
41 See Choi, The Choice of Competition Law, supra n. 25, at 134–37.
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competition law legislation include South Korea, China, and recently, Hong
Kong. Different reasons behind legislation can affect attitudes towards the enforce-
ment of competition law. When, on the other hand, there is intrinsic motivation
for legislation, the public will recognize the benefits of open and competitive
markets, thus supporting a strong competition culture42 that will promote effective
enforcement by public authorities and eventually result in a vigorous application of
the law.43 Under such conditions, the country is willing to establish a legal
framework for cooperation with the competition regimes of other countries
characterized by strong enforcement. This is fundamentally different from the
situation involved in the first category.
Therefore, an important prerequisite for international competition enforce-
ment is a robust national competition law culture that buttresses competition law
and policy.44 However, the strong link between competition and trade may
compensate the absence of an effective competition regime at home. In particular,
where a bilateral agreement includes effective cooperation in the field of competi-
tion, a weak competition regime in one of the partner countries may take
advantage of the enforcement cooperation provided for in the agreement in
cases relating to the conduct of foreign undertakings.45 This may have an overall
effect on competition law enforcement in that country.
To summarize, the motives underlying competition legislation are crucial for
the success of international cooperation. Without genuine conviction as to the
usefulness of competition law, the competition culture in a given country will not
thrive. However, international cooperation may have a beneficial influence on
national competition culture because advanced experiences in partner countries
may spill over to countries lagging behind. A positive side effect of convergence
may be that discrimination against foreign enterprises comes to an end, making
conditions for market entry friendlier.46 On the other hand, there is the risk that
the over-enforcement of competition law in one jurisdiction spreads to the trading
42 Culture plays a pivotal role in the development of competition legislation and enforcement. See Choi,
The Choice of Competition Law, supra n. 25, at 146–147; Dabbah, supra n. 13, at 62–70.
43 The low level of enforcement in developing countries stems from the weakness of their competition
law culture. See Michal S. Gal, Regional Competition Law Agreements: An Important Step for Antitrust
Enforcement, 60 U. Toronto L. J. 239, at 247–248 (2010).
44 See Gerber, supra n. 33, at 267. Gerber argues that there are some factors that influence the develop-
ment of competition law, such as public knowledge about competition law norms, the predictability of
the law, the independence of the competition authorities, and the perception of the statutes. These
factors are strongly related to the overall competition law culture, which will eventually lead to the
improvement of public enforcement and legal certainty.
45 See Noonan, supra n. 15, at 510.
46 See Yo Sop Choi, Competition Laws and Policies Against International Cartels in Northeast Asia: International
Cooperation for Effective Enforcement, in Cartels in Asia: Law & Practice 150–151 (Thomas Cheng, Sandra
Marco Colino & Burton Ong eds, Kluwer 2015).
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partners, which might have a chilling effect.47 Therefore, additionally in a trade
context, the appropriate design of competition law is fundamental.
2.2 CONVERGENCE OF SUBSTANTIVE COMPETITION RULES: BASIC PRINCIPLES
Most countries’ competition regimes contain three substantive sets of rules,
including the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements, the abuse of a domi-
nant position or monopolization,48 and the control of mergers with respect to
their effects on competition. The analogous architecture of substantive provi-
sions in the field of competition law demonstrates impressive convergence on a
worldwide level, distinctive from a comparative perspective.49 However, there
are many variations regarding details. With respect to anti-competitive agree-
ments, many competition regimes treat hardcore restrictions, such as agree-
ments regarding price-fixing, output restrictions, market sharing, and bid-
rigging, as per se or quasi-per se illegal, thus demonstrating their common
philosophy of zero tolerance for hardcore cartels. Nonetheless, there are diver-
ging views on the issue of tacit collusion. In some competition regimes, such as
that of the EU, the sharing of critical information, such as individual and future
prices or output, between competing undertakings is deemed to constitute
illegal concerted practices. By contrast, this view has not been accepted by
other jurisdictions, despite their adoption of provisions prohibiting concerted
practices.50
With regard to provisions prohibiting the abuse of a dominant position or
monopolization, the divergence among competition regimes is even more
notable.51 Regarding dominance, some competition regimes have adopted the
concept of collective dominance, which originates in European competition
law. By contrast, some competition regimes, despite their considerable
47 Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect, 107(1) Nw. U. L. Rev. 19–22 (2012); Damien Geradin, The Perils of
Antitrust Proliferation: The Globalization of Antitrust and the Risks of Overregulation of Competitive Behavior,
10 Chi. J. Int’l L. 189, at 192 (2009).
48 In US antitrust law, s. 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits monopolization or attempts to monopolize,
while most competition regimes – including those of the EU and many Asian countries – prohibit the
abuse of a dominant position.
49 See Basedow, supra n. 3, at 322; Dabbah, supra n. 13, at 13.
50 See e.g. Supreme Court of Korea Judgment 2013du25924 (24 Dec. 2015). The Supreme Court of
Korea held that the South Korean competition authority failed to provide evidence of the existence of
agreements in a case involving the sharing of critical information. See also Yo Sop Choi, The Evolution
of Fair and Free Competition Law in the Republic of Korea, Research Handbook on Asian Competition Law 65,
73 (in Steven Van Uytsel, Shuya Hayashi & John O. Haley eds, Edward Elgar 2020).
51 In particular, US and EU competition regimes have – in spite of some convergence – clear differences
regarding unilateral conduct, see Einer Elhauge & Damien Geradin, Global Competition Law and
Economics 1137–1141 (2d ed., Hart Publishing 2011); Evans, supra n. 16, at 187.
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willingness to adopt EU concepts, have not accepted the concept of collective
dominance.52
Regarding abuse, there are differences with respect to the fundamental dis-
tinction between exploitative and exclusionary abuse: exploitative abuse refers to
conduct with respect to the other market side (suppliers or customers), for example
excessive pricing, whereas exclusionary abuse addresses business conduct that
obstructs or eliminates competing firms. In particular, US antitrust law does not
cover exploitative abuse, as the US regime assumes that excessive pricing or high
prices induce more competition in the market, whereas the competition regimes of
the EU and other jurisdictions that have accepted the European approach prohibit
exploitative abuse because this type of conduct leads to results that do not
correspond to competitive conditions. Moreover, the unilateral conduct rules of
the various competition regimes have different aims. Whereas in the US they are
essentially aimed at consumer welfare and efficiency, other jurisdictions have
adopted the idea of competitive fairness.53 In particular, the concept of fairness
recently influences the development of a competition rule of abuses of a superior
position in the digital economy. Therefore, in jurisdictions other than the US, the
term anti-competitiveness often embraces the broad concept of unfairness.54
With respect to merger control, there is considerable diversity regarding the
conditions of notification. Many jurisdictions provide for an obligation to notify
linked to certain thresholds (often but not always based on turnover); in other
jurisdictions notification is provided on a voluntary basis. Regarding the substan-
tive appraisal test, the US merger control regime uses the ‘substantial lessening of
competition’ (SLC) test, while the EU regime has adopted the ‘significant impedi-
ment to effective competition’ (SIEC) test. Although the terminology in the two
tests differs, varying outcomes in practice owe less to different concepts than to the
appreciation of facts in the single case.
In conclusion, there is a lot of convergence in the areas of anti-competitive
agreements and merger control, whereas the rules on unilateral conduct (abuse of a
dominant position or monopolization) are characterized by considerable divergence.
One of the major reasons for this observation is the fact that rules on unilateral conduct
52 For example, China has adopted the rule of abuse of market dominance, whose context is very similar
to Art. 102 TFEU, but its legal provision does not include collective dominance.
53 Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel Crane, Global Issues in Antitrust and Competition Law 94–95 (West 2010);
Gerber, supra n. 33, at 313; Jae Ho Sung, Some Reflections on Competition and Subsidies Under the EU–
Korea FTA, in The European Union and South Korea: The Legal Framework for Strengthening Trade,
Economic and Political Relations 90 (James Harrison ed., Edinburgh University Press 2014).
54 Yo Sop Choi & Kazuhiko Fuchikawa, Comparative Analysis of Competition Laws on Buyer Power in Korea
and Japan, 33 World Comp. 499 (2010); Eleanor M. Fox, We Protect Competition, You Protect Competitors,
26 World Comp. 149, at 163 (2003). See also European Commission, Single Market – New Complementary
Tool to Strengthen Competition Enforcement (2 June 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regula
tion/have-your-say/initiatives/12416-New-competition-tool (accessed 4 Nov. 2020).
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are frequently influenced by the fundamental objectives of competition law. In many
developing countries, various socio-political goals, such as fair competition, seem
important.55 A current task of developing countries’ competition regimes is therefore
to harmonize these general objectives and blend them with the goal of economic
efficiency, while the US antitrust regime seems to focus more on improving the
concept of efficiency.
With respect to free trade agreements, it is important to note that countries
must make efforts for the convergence of their substantive competition rules in
order to pave the way for common competition chapters in their FTAs. This is
only possible if countries study the competition law of their trading partners. In the
absence of knowledge about others’ domestic economic policies, it is impossible to
achieve successful cooperation.56
2.3 BILATERALISM AND THE CHOICE OF STANDARDS: THE DESIGN OF A COMMON
FRAMEWORK
One of the most popular models for competition chapters in FTAs is the European
standard text, as the EU regularly demands that competition chapters be integrated into
its trade agreements.57 As explained in the introduction, there are two leading competi-
tion regimes: US antitrust and EU competition rules. For developing countries, the
European approach is often more familiar because it fits better with these countries’ civil
law backgrounds.58 The cases of South Korea and China demonstrate this clearly.
In fact, the South Korean government has entered into a number of FTAs that
contain competition chapters. However, these texts often content themselves with
confirming competition law aims and emphasizing the importance of cooperation
in this field.59 It would be wrong, however, to qualify these texts as mere soft law
55 The concept of fairness has become quite popular. Indeed, one of the tasks of competition law is the
protection of markets guaranteeing advantageous outcomes for everyone. However, it is highly
debatable whether the concept of fairness should be referred to when it comes to the interpretation
and application of specific competition law rules. The fairness concept has influenced not only
European countries, but also Asian developing countries, including South Korea. For further details
on fairness or other popular values in competition law, see Jones & Sufrin, supra n. 1, at 28; Sullivan,
Grimes & Sagers, supra n. 4, at 18–19.
56 See e.g. Noonan, supra n. 15, at 22.
57 See Gerber, supra n. 33, at 109. See also Mark R. A. Palim, The Worldwide Growth of Competition Law:
An Empirical Analysis, 43 Antitrust Bull. 106, at 121 (1998); Anestis S. Papadopoulos, The International
Dimension of EU Competition Law and Policy 215 (Cambridge University Press 2010).
58 Yo Sop Choi, A Critical Review of Competition Law on Abuse of Market Dominance in the Southeast Asian
Developing Countries: A Comparative Perspective, 41 Kangwon L. Rev. 1043, at 1051 (2014); Gerber,
supra n. 33, at 161. In particular, a stronger party often has the power to spur harmonization based on
its own provisions. See also Eleanor M. Fox, Harmonization of Law and Procedures in a Globalized World:
Why, What, and How?, 60 Antitrust L. J. 593, at 596 (1992).
59 See Sung, supra n. 53, at 91; Kennedy, supra n. 7, at 41.
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declarations.60 A bilateral trade agreement has a binding effect that can ensure
domestic compliance with its competition chapter.61 For example, the competition
chapter in the Korea–EU FTA (Chapter 11) may instigate the South Korean
legislature to adopt the European competition law model.62 Although it does
not oblige the Parties to a significant level of cooperation, it establishes voluntary
mechanisms for improving investigations and encourages each Party to intensify its
competition law practice.63
In particular, the competition chapter of the Korea–EU FTA64 duplicates the
EU competition rules of Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union (TFEU), which prohibit anti-competitive agreements and the
abuse of dominance, respectively.65 In addition, the third provision, especially the
use of the terms ‘concentration’ and ‘SIEC’, is modelled on European merger
control.66 It is fascinating to see that the same terminology has been used in the
competition chapter of the Korea–China FTA. Article 14.3 of this Agreement
provides definitions of the three anti-competitive business practices, which are
identical to the Korea–EU FTA competition chapter.67 The Korea–China FTA
thus represents an example of the Europeanization of competition law, which at
the same time leads to localized harmonization in Asia on the basis of the European
competition law model.68
In particular, the experience with the Korea–China FTA illustrates two
requisites for the convergence of competition law. The first pertains to substantive
law. South Korea’s competition act, i.e. the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade
Act (MRFTA), as well as the Chinese competition act, i.e. the Anti-Monopoly
60 See e.g. Noonan, supra n. 15, at 495.
61 See Choi, The Choice of Competition Law, supra n. 25, at 151–154; D. Daniel Sokol, Order without
(Enforceable) Law: Why Countries Enter into Non-Enforceable Competition Policy Chapters in Free Trade
Agreements, 83 Chicago-Kent L. Rev. 232 (2008), at 259–260.
62 Regarding hardcore cartels, see e.g. Choi, Competition Laws and Policies, supra n. 46, at 152–153.
63 See Gerber, supra n. 33, at 109.
64 Article 11.1(3) mentions the following business practices: first, agreements between undertakings,
decisions of business associations and concerted practices that have as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition; second, abusive conduct by one or more under-
takings that have a dominant position; and third, concentrations between undertakings that signifi-
cantly impede effective competition in particular as a consequence of creating or strengthening a
dominant position.
65 Yo Sop Choi, A Study on the Bilateral Cooperation of Competition Law Enforcement Under the Korea–EU
FTA, 34 J. Eur. Union Stud. 3, at 15 (2013).
66 For a discussion of the European influence, see Papadopoulos, supra n. 57, at 105.
67 The Korea–China FTA defines the prohibited conduct as agreements between undertakings, decisions
of business associations, and concerted practices that have as their object or effect the prevention of
competition. It also covers one or more abuses by undertakings, rendering it clear that collective
dominance is also covered. For merger control, it adopts the SIEC test and mentions competition
concerns due to the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, thus adopting the European
conception.
68 See Choi, Convergence of Competition Laws, supra n. 13, at 22.
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Law (AML), both accept the presumption of market dominance and the SIEC test
in merger control. The second element is the fact that instead of using the national
law of one of the Parties to the agreement (either the MRFTA or the AML), the
law of a third jurisdiction (i.e. the EU) is given preference. The choice of a
‘neutral’ model is facilitated by the fact that both the South Korean and Chinese
competition laws were largely influenced by the EU competition regime when
they were drafted.69 Of course, the framework must be tailored to the local socio-
political background.70 However, a similar background certainly promotes the
convergence of national competition laws and facilitates effective enforcement
cooperation.71
Indeed, including a competition chapter in an FTA is not sufficient to achieve
a significant level of cooperation between competition regimes. Nevertheless, it is
essential for the implementation of national competition law to agree upon a
common definition of anti-competitive conduct. A mutual understanding of the
language of each competition law arises, improving the development of national
competition law enforcement. At the same time, a localized standard emerges. Of
course, it is not always easy to achieve an effective application of certain provisions.
For instance, although some competition regimes such as South Korea address
collective dominance, it is difficult to find a meaningful application of the relevant
provisions in practice.72
To conclude, the bilateral model is more than a simple declaration of coop-
eration between competition regimes. For the developing world, the definitions in
the competition chapters of FTAs can be used as a standard.73 Moreover, FTAs can
deliver an important platform for competition investigations, eventually improving
market access and trade flows as a result.74 Bilateral cooperation is especially useful
for competition authorities in small and developing countries, which face limited
enforcement due to the lack of resources for investigations.75 In addition,
69 See Gerber, supra n. 33, at 207; Vivien Rose & David Bailey, Bellamy & Child European Union Law of
Competition 53 (7th ed., Oxford University Press 2013).
70 See Cheng, supra n. 13, at 489–490.
71 A further example is the Korea–New Zealand FTA. Article 12.2, which includes definitions similar to
those in the Korea-China FTA. Furthermore, the language is almost identical to the European
provisions.
72 In South Korea, contrary to the EU, the concept of collective dominance has been discussed
intensively, but the Supreme Court has established high standards for proving the existence of
collective dominance, e.g. Supreme Court of Korea Judgment 2003du6283 (9 Dec. 2005).
Moreover, there has not been a single case of collective dominance in other Asian countries, see
Choi, Convergence of Competition Laws, supra n. 13, at 23–24.
73 For the EU, this bilateral method may be a part of a strategy aimed at strengthening its international
influence. See e.g. Dabbah, supra n. 13, at 201–204.
74 See Dabbah, supra n. 13, at 597.
75 Michal S. Gal, Antitrust in a Globalized Economy: The Unique Enforcement Challenges Faced by Small and
Developing Jurisdictions, 33(1) Fordham Int’l L. J. 39, at 39–40 (2009).
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bilateralism is a crucial means to overcome problems of extraterritoriality. Finally,
the process of convergence76 improves legal certainty by helping MNEs to predict
the consequences of anti-competitive conduct in the countries in which they
operate.77
3 HARMONIZATION OF COMPETITION LAWS: TOWARDS
EVOLUTIONARY REFORMS
3.1 BILATERAL AND REGIONAL COOPERATION AS THE BASIS FOR FURTHER
DEVELOPMENT
For close to a century, there have been proposals to establish an international
competition law.78 These proposals reached a preliminary peak when the WTO
added the topic of competition policy to its agenda, but ended in disillusionment
when the WTO Ministerial Conference failed in 2003, with the competition topic
being removed from the WTO agenda in 2004.79 In fact, organizations like
UNCTAD, OECD and WTO have contributed considerably toward implanting
modern competition rules all over the world, including in developing countries.
However, experience has shown that – due to substantive differences and to
concerns regarding sovereignty – the time is not yet ripe for a sole monitoring
authority at the global level.80 Reaching consensus regarding an international
competition law regime is challenging, because each country is at a different
stage of economic and socio-cultural development and has varied interests or
goals.81 Therefore, convergence in a bilateral or regional way may be easier to
achieve than a multilateral approach, considering the specific interests or aims of
competition policies in each jurisdiction.82 Against this background, it does not
come as a surprise that the number of FTAs providing for competition rules has
76 See e.g. Maher M. Dabbah, Future Directions in Bilateral Cooperation: A Policy Perspective, in Cooperation,
Comity, and Competition Policy 297 (Andrew T. Guzman ed., Oxford University Press 2011); Sweeney,
supra n. 1, at 277.
77 Deborah Platt Majoras, Convergence, Conflict, and Comity: The Search for Coherence in International
Competition Policy, in 2007 Fordham Competition Law Institute: International Antitrust Law & Policy 7
(B. Hawk ed., Juris Publishing 2008).
78 William Oualid, Les ententes industrielles internationales et leurs conséquences sociales – la défense des
travailleurs et des consommateurs (League of Nations 1926). The French professor requested the incor-
poration of rules on anticompetitive conduct into the legal system of the League of Nations.
79 For a background on these events, see Robert D. Anderson et al., Competition Policy, Trade and the
Global Economy: Existing WTO Elements, Commitments in Regional Trade Agreements, Current Challenges
and Issues for Reflection, Staff Working Paper ERSD-2018-12 6 (WTO 2018).
80 The most ambitious proposal for an ‘International Antitrust Authority’ was the ‘Munich Code’
published in 1993. See Draft International Antitrust Code (Wolfgang Fikentscher & Ulrich Immenga
eds, Nomos 1995).
81 See Jones & Sufrin, supra n. 1, at 1241.
82 See Gerber, supra n. 33, at 9.
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increased considerably, especially since the activities of the WTO Working Group
on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy were suspended in
2004.83
One of the advantages of bilateral cooperation is the fact that it is less
costly than multilateral coordination, because multilateral efforts cause high
monitoring and enforcement costs.84 Contenting oneself with bilateral and
regional cooperation may also reduce the risk of international conflicts. In
effect, one of the main reasons for international cooperation is the reduction
of potential conflicts among competition regimes.85 In particular, where there is
strong disparity in the ultimate objectives or priorities of the laws,86 different
decisions by the respective competition authorities are possible. The concept of
fairness may serve as an example. Bilateral and regional cooperation may
mitigate this risk.
Although there is worldwide convergence in the substantive rules, con-
siderable divergence exists with regard to the philosophical foundations of
competition law.87 For example, the South Korean competition regime has
developed its law and policy based on the goal of fair and free competition, and
in its enforcement, the concept of fairness has become paramount. On the
other hand, Chinese competition law is aimed at supporting its socialist market
economy, which is different from the goals of competition regimes in other
countries. When there is a lack of consistency in the interpretation of the
objectives of the law,88 the gap between the different competition regimes
becomes wider. The insight that the goals of competition laws affect their
implementation can be seen nowhere more clearly than in the field of abuse
of dominant positions.89 Another important element of bilateral and regional
FTAs are non-discrimination rules.90 It is essential that competition rules are
conceived and applied in the same way with respect to both domestic and
83 Anderson et al., supra n. 79, at 31.
84 See e.g. John O. McGinns, The Political Economy of International Antitrust Harmonization, 45 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 549, at 560–562 (2003).
85 See Dabbah, supra n. 13, at 516. For further discussion on problems of extraterritoriality in competition
law enforcement and possible solutions, see Seung Wha Chang, Extraterritorial Application of U.S.
Antitrust Laws to Other Pacific Countries: Proposed Bilateral Agreements for Resolving International Conflicts
Within the Pacific Community, 16 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 295 (1993).
86 See Noonan, supra n. 15, at 7–8. National competition laws may – among other things – aim for
consumer welfare, total welfare, market access protection of the competitive process, or for non-
competition goals.
87 See Scherer, supra n. 6, at 17.
88 Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang, Towards an Extraterritorial Application of the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law
that Avoids Trade Conflicts, 45 Geo. Wash. Int’l L. Rev. 501, at 514 (2013).
89 See Noonan, supra n. 15, at 63.
90 Alan O. Sykes, Externalities in Open Economy Antitrust and Their Implications for International Competition
Policy, 23 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 89, at 94 (2000).
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foreign entities. In particular, one of the tasks of transnational cooperation is to
prohibit the foreclosure of foreign companies.91
Therefore, bilateral and regional agreements need to provide guidance on the
values and objectives of competition law and policy, including the consequences
for practical enforcement. For instance, many competition laws in Asian develop-
ing countries outline the goals of their laws. However, most of these statements
contain rather broadly formulated terms emphasizing the public interest and
invoking the socio-political context, resulting in a lack of clarity. Instead, it
would be important to develop the concept of efficiency and to specify its
relationship with the goal of fairness.92 Moreover, some have argued that trade
law is not focused solely on efficiency, for example in dumping cases.93
Even if it is unrealistic that competition rules and their enforcement will
become uniform in different jurisdictions, a comparison of the goals of competi-
tion law and a common solution in bilateral or regional FTAs may facilitate
convergence.94 In other words, clearer guidance regarding efficiency and fairness
as well as on the role of economic analysis may create a sound level of conver-
gence, which would reduce tensions in the implementation of the respective
competition laws.95 This process may be promoted by the fact that an approxima-
tion as to the underlying objectives of competition law seems to have occurred: the
goals of protecting the competitive process and of maximizing consumer welfare
are apparently no longer being opposed as sharply as in the past.96
91 For example, there were some international cases regarding market foreclosure in the WTO disputes,
such as the Structural Impediments Initiatives (SII) to resolve the vertical foreclosures in the Japanese
market (the Kodak/Fuji dispute) and Mexican Telecom. For further case analyses, see William H.
Barringer, Competition Policy and Cross Border Dispute Resolution: Lessons Learned from the U.S. – Japan
Film Dispute, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 459 (1998); Dabbah, supra n. 13, at 266; Eleanor M. Fox, The
WTO’s First Antitrust Case – Mexican Telecom: A Sleeping Victory for Trade and Competition, 9 J. Int’l
Econ. L. 271 (2006); John O. Haley, Competition and Trade Policy: Antitrust Enforcement: Do Differences
Matter?, 4 Pac. Rim L. & Pol’y 303 (1995); Patricia Isela Hansen, Antitrust in the Global Market:
Rethinking ‘Reasonable Expectations’, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1601 (1999); Mitsuo Matsushita, The Structural
Impediments Initiative: An Example of Bilateral Trade Negotiation, 12 Mich. J. Int’l L. 436 (1991); Scherer,
supra n. 2, at 76.
92 Edward M. Graham & J. David Richardson, Issue Overview, in Global Competition Policy 8 (Edward M.
Graham & J. David Richardson eds, Institute for International Economics 1997). The authors further
assert that the fairness concept in competition policy is vague and culturally distinctive. Fairness is often
related to differences in bargaining power. See e.g. Phillip Areeda, Louis Kaplow & Aaron Edlin,
Antitrust Analysis: Problems, Text, and Cases 22 (7th ed., Wolters Kluwer 2013); Herbert Hovenkamp,
Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and Its Practice 70 (5th ed., West Academic Publishing
2016).
93 Donald I. Baker, The Proper Role for Antitrust in a Not-Yet-Global Economy, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 1135, at
114 (1988).
94 See e.g. Jonathan Galloway, Moving Towards a Template for Bilateral Antitrust Agreements, 28 World
Comp. 589, at 613 (2005).
95 See Noonan, supra n. 15, at 68.
96 See Evans, supra n. 16, at 168–169; Gerber, supra n. 33, at 4.
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This process is of great importance under another angle. Many observers
take the view that trade barriers based on borders such as tariffs and quotas are
rapidly diminishing,97 while technical or other types of barriers, such as the
disparities in competition law, have become a potential threat to free trade.
To successfully react to this challenge, it is crucial to gain mutual under-
standing regarding the objectives of competition law. For this purpose, an
important obstacle must be removed: the individual characteristics of each
competition regime are based on distinctive experiences, and external pressure
towards convergence may not be suitable to achieve greater consistency.98 By
contrast, the bilateral or regional approach allows common ground to be
found, for example with respect to the treatment of competition law cases
that are of mutual interest.99 In addition, discussions of the objectives of
competition law may reduce divergence in the implementation of the laws,
for example regarding unilateral conduct.
To summarize, consideration of the deeper reasons behind the respective
competition legislation, along with a discussion of its goals including the
weight of fairness and of the protection of the competitive process, may
lead to convergence of the substantive rules and their enforcement.100
Although it cannot be denied that there are differing enforcement priorities
in each jurisdiction,101 the recent development of cooperation narrows the
differences. Regarding the level of coordination, bilateral and regional coop-
eration is better suited at present, at least as regards the adoption of binding
rules. By contrast, the multilateral level is the ideal forum for discussion and
for adopting soft law.
3.2 POSSIBLE ELEMENTS IN FTAS RELATING TO SUBSTANTIVE COMPETITION LAW
Although FTAs should reflect the specific interests of each trading country, it is
crucial to establish a model competition chapter that includes the basic substantive
97 See Graham & Richardson, supra n. 92, at 3.
98 Kfir Abutbul, The U.S. and E.U. Approaches to Competition Law: Convergent or Divergent Paths?, 17
Colum. J. Eur. L. 102, at 106 (2011).
99 The former chairman of the US Federal Trade Commission, Majoras, pleaded in favour of bilateral
cooperation and exchange of ideas, e.g. regarding monopolization or the abuse of market power, see
Deborah Platt Majoras, Convergence, Conflict, and Comity: The Search for Coherence in International
Competition Policy, in 2007 Fordham Competition Law Institute: International Antitrust Law & Policy 19
(B. Hawk ed., Juris Publishing 2008).
100 The adoption of similar key ideas can reduce conflicts in enforcement between countries, eventually
leading to a coherent and consistent implementation of national competition law. See Noonan, supra n.
15, at 1.
101 See e.g. Ken Heyer, A World of Uncertainty: Economics and the Globalization of Antitrust, 72 Antitrust L. J.
376, at 421–422 (2005).
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provisions.102 Especially for developing competition regimes, it is important to
have a similar framework in order to achieve comparable implementation and thus
to reduce conflicts in the simultaneous application of competition law.103
Moreover, such a competition chapter has the task of guaranteeing the funda-
mental principle of non-discrimination: foreign firms must not be discriminated in
the application of competition law. In order to reach this outcome, it is necessary
to harmonize substantive rules as set forth below.104
First, in the field of restrictive agreements, with the exception of the US
antitrust regime, most competition laws do not include a per se rule according to
which certain practices are always and without exception unlawful. For the
purpose of FTAs, the European approach, which is characterized by the consistent
availability of the efficiency defence, should therefore be preferred. The rigorous
approach towards hardcore cartels is guaranteed by the distinction between restric-
tions by object and by effect, as well as by the fact that exemptions are not very
probable when obviously harmful agreements are involved. However, there is no
automatic per se illegality, which in the transnational context has the advantage that
each competition regime may consider the possibility of an exemption for public
interest reasons.
Second, one of the most controversial areas in competition law is the design of
rules regarding unilateral conduct, such as the rule on abuses of a superior power or
bargaining position by online platforms or gatekeepers. In effect, the competition
rules regarding the abuse of market positions may be influenced by the particular
aims of the competition law in a given country. Therefore, it seems difficult to
achieve perfect harmonization in this area. In particular, US antitrust law does not
cover exploitative abuse nor the concept of collective dominance, whereas most
competition regimes modelled on the EU’s competition provisions have endorsed
these two concepts. Considering the difficulty in achieving the convergence of
such rules, we suggest renouncing on such rules while also maintaining the
principle of non-discrimination in this contested area.
In addition, rules on the abuse of market power should be accompanied by an
explicit presumption of dominance. In effect, quite a number of jurisdictions
102 By underlining the desirability of a competition chapter, it shall not be ignored that FTAs regularly
contain competition-related provisions in chapters dealing with other trade problems, e.g. sector-specific
rules, intellectual property, subsidies and state-owned enterprises. See Laprévote, supra n. 20, at 4–5.
103 Generally on the benefits and obstacles of regional competition law with respect to developing
countries, see Michal S. Gal & Inbal Faibish Wassmer, Regional Agreements of Developing Jurisdictions:
Unleashing the Potential, in Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries 291 (Josef
Drexl et al. eds, Edward Elgar 2012).
104 The harmonization of substantive competition law is often understood as the basic level of harmoniza-
tion of competition laws and policies. See Richard O. Cunningham & Anthony J. LaRocca,
Harmonization of Competition Policies in a Regional Economic Integration, 27 L. & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 880,
at 881 (1996).
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(although not the US and the EU), especially in Asia, have adopted a presumption
of market dominance based on market share. The precise percentage starting from
which dominance is presumed varies between competition regimes. In the com-
petition chapters of FTAs, for the sake of harmonization, a market share of 40%
could be chosen (with respect to a single undertaking). When an undertaking holds
a market share of at least 40%, it can be presumed to be dominant, although other
factors such as entry barriers and relative market shares may be considered. Such a
presumption would facilitate the creation of common standards in the field of
unilateral conduct.
Third, merger control is more complex than the two provisions mentioned
above because it is often influenced by political considerations, for example by the
goal of strengthening national champions. Therefore, the risk of a discriminatory
application of competition law with respect to domestic and to foreign firms is
particularly high. Against this backdrop, it is important to reach convergence as to
the substantive appraisal test. With the transition of the EU from a classical
dominance test toward the SIEC test in 2004, the distinction from US antitrust
law with its SLC test has considerably diminished. It seems secondary how the test
is labelled. It is much more important to adopt a common approach based on
sound economic principles and considering both the coordinated and the unilateral
effects.
To summarize, the suggestions regarding substantive rules in FTAs seek to
create a common understanding of the role of competition law and policy between
the contracting parties. The adoption of similar substantive rules is certainly an
ambitious project, but it seems necessary in order to implement the more general
consensus on the goals of competition policy. The harmonization of substantive
competition rules in an FTA will undoubtedly have an impact on the enforcement
of competition law in the partner countries. In sum, meaningful convergence
requires an understanding of the objectives of competition law as well as a
common framework of substantive provisions.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Today, there are hundreds of FTAs (both bilateral and regional) that contain
competition chapters or at least competition rules incorporated in other free trade
contexts.105 Competition law in FTAs has different functions.106 First, there is an
105 See Laprévote, supra n. 20, at 4, who has analysed 267 of such FTAs included in the WTO’s Regional
Trade Agreements database. For regional integration associations in developing countries, see the
contributions in Competition Policy and Regional Integration in Developing Countries (Josef Drexl et al.
eds, Edward Elgar 2012).
106 See Anderson et al., supra n. 79, at 27–28.
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integration function. The abolition of state barriers to trade shall not be undermined
by private restraints, for example by the partitioning of sales territories in distribution
agreements.107 Second, the general purposes of any national competition law, be it
consumer welfare and efficiency, the protection of the competitive process, or
economic and social development and fairness, are sought.108 Third, the protec-
tionist use of competition law is banned by prohibiting discriminatory enforcement
with respect to domestic and foreign firms.109 However, clashes between states do
not only occur because of discriminatory enforcement, but due to differences
regarding substance.110 This leads to the fourth – and most underestimated – function
of bilateral and regional competition law: harmonization. The creation of common
competition rules by FTAs can lessen disagreement and reduce clashes and the
probability of trade wars.111 This last point is particularly important in a time
where more than 130 jurisdictions have adopted a competition law.
Compared to the ideal of an international competition agreement, bilateral
and regional competition rules have often been considered second-best. This
article has aimed to correct this misunderstanding as well as upgrade the signifi-
cance of transnational competition rules restricted to a limited number of states.112
The elaboration of such rules obligates the trading partners to study the other
parties’ competition regimes and to learn from each other. This process creates
spillover effects of the competition law of one country on other countries.113
Certainly, such rules are important for international trade, as traditional ‘across the
border’ matters are complemented by ‘behind the border’ issues,114 a phenomenon
107 See e.g. Art. 11.1(1) Korea–EU FTA: ‘The Parties undertake to apply their respective competition
laws so as to prevent the benefits of the trade liberalization process in goods, services and establishment
from being removed or eliminated by anticompetitive business conduct or anti-competitive
transactions’.
108 See e.g. Art. 15.2(1) Korea–Peru FTA: ‘Each Party shall maintain competition laws that promote and
protect the competitive process in its market by proscribing anti-competitive business conducts. Each
Party shall take appropriate action with respect to anti-competitive business conducts with the
objective of promoting economic efficiency and consumer welfare’.
109 See e.g. Art. 11.3(2) Korea–EU FTA: ‘The Parties recognize the importance of applying their
respective competition laws in a transparent, timely and non-discriminatory manner, respecting the
principles of procedural fairness and rights of defence of the parties concerned’.
110 In effect, certain types of competition law enforcement have produced conflicts between national
authorities due to their different approaches to unilateral conduct and mergers, see e.g. the GE/
Honeywell merger and the Microsoft case. For case discussions, see Eleanor M. Fox, GE/Honeywell: The
U.S. Merger that Europe Stopped – A Story of the Politics of Convergence, in Antitrust Stories 343–347
(Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds, Foundation Press 2007); John J. Parisi, Cooperation Among
Competition Authorities in Merger Regulation, 43 Cornell Int’l L. J. 55, at 56–59 (2010).
111 See Fox, supra n. 110, at 356.
112 See also Gerber, supra n. 11, at 126.
113 See e.g. Benoît Durand, Andrés F. Galarza & Kirtikumar Mehta, The Interface Between Competition Policy
and International Trade Liberalisation. Looking into the Future: Applying a New Virtual Anti-Trust Standard,
27 World Comp. 3 (2004).
114 See Fox, Toward World Antitrust, supra n. 19, at 3; Kennedy, supra n. 7, at 5.
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that is frequently described as ‘deep bilateralism’.115 For our context, it is crucial
though that the new intensity of bilateralism leads to convergence in the field of
competition law. This process has been described here as localized harmonization.
The close relationship between selected trading partners facilitates progress on a
bilateral and regional level that, for the time being, is not feasible at the global
level. The second wave is effective cooperation between competition authorities
based on formal agreements. Bilateral and regional cooperation allows effective
enforcement in the absence of a single international regime having legally binding
force,116 especially when it can satisfy a competition agency’s need to have access
to information and to collect necessary evidence beyond its competition
jurisdiction.117
Seen from a wider perspective, bilateral and regional cooperation contri-
butes to the development of global standards in competition law and thus
prepares the next step, which is a binding international competition agreement.
Organizations like the OECD, UNCTAD, WTO and ICN have already
achieved tremendous progress in international cooperation, the latest steps
being the ICN’s Framework on Competition Agency Procedures (CAP) of
2019118 and UNCTAD’s Guiding Policies and Procedures (GPP) to be adopted
at the Eighth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of
Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of
Restrictive Business Practices in July 2020.119 However, these texts are non-
binding commitments of a soft-law nature and therefore do not reach the same
intensity as a formally binding multilateral agreement.120 Due to the close link
between competition and trade, the WTO would be the appropriate place to
incorporate such an agreement. The existence of an abundant competition law
in FTAs illustrates that international efforts in this area are indispensable. This
bilateral and regional body of law may help to sketch out a global standard for
competition law rules and international cooperation.121 The WTO Working
Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, whose
115 See e.g. Debra Johnson & Colin Turner, European Business 351 (3d ed., Routledge 2016).
116 Anu Bradford, International Antitrust Negotiations and the False Hope of the WTO, 48 Harv. Int’l L. J. 383
(2007); Scherer, supra n. 6, at 17.
117 See Choi, Competition Laws and Policies, supra n. 46, at 144–147; Kennedy, supra n. 7, at 40.
118 International Competition Network, ICN Framework for Competition Agency Procedures (CAP) (2018),
https://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/ICN_CAP.pdf
(accessed 4 Nov. 2020).
119 UNCTAD, Eighth United Nations Conference to Review All Aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed
Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive Business Practices (2020), https://unctad.org/en/
pages/MeetingDetails.aspx?meetingid=2364 (accessed 4 Nov. 2020).
120 Regarding ‘the medium- and long-term shortcomings of a soft law approach’, see Laprévote, supra n.
20, at 36.
121 See Choi, Convergence of Competition Laws, supra n. 13, at 20–21.
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activities have been suspended, might be reactivated and serve as a basis for
further reflections.122 Independently from the prospect of such an endeavour,
the increasing importance of competition law in bilateral and regional FTAs
clearly reveals that trade and competition belong together. It is only a question
of time before this insight will lead to new attempts regarding the integration of
binding competition rules into the world trading system at a global level.
122 Anderson et al., supra n. 79, at 60.
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